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In the 1990s, rural areas and small towns in the United States, which had been losing 
population, became the destinations for an increasing number of Hispanic immigrants and 
their families, slowing and in some cases reversing population declines. In this paper, we 
examine whether faster growth in the Hispanic population is linked to faster growth in income 
per capita in rural areas and small towns. Our results indicate strong support for the 
hypothesis that Hispanic population growth has fueled increased economic growth in those 
small, rural communities whose populations had been in decline during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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 Are Hispanic Immigrant Families Reviving the Economies of America’s Small Towns? 
 
Historically, young Americans have moved out of rural areas and small towns, leaving 
behind smaller and older populations.  Consistent with this trend, in the 1970s and 1980s 
population shrank in non-metropolitan areas across the Great Plains in the Midwest, Appalachia 
in the East, and parts of the Old South, even as the population grew on the East and West Coasts 
and in the Sun Belt.  In the 1990s, Hispanic immigrants and their families began to look beyond 
traditional immigrant destinations towards these small towns and rural areas, slowing and in 
some cases reversing population declines in non-metropolitan areas in the United States (Johnson 
and Lichter, 2008; and Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon, 2005).    As a recent front page article in 
USA Today hypothesized: ―for declining counties, many in the Great Plains, the growth in young 
Hispanics may be the only way out of a population spiral‖ (El Nasser, 2008, p.1)  
Johnson and Lichter (2008) show that the growth in Hispanic populations in non-
metropolitan areas is being driven as much by births to immigrant families as by immigrants 
themselves. Indeed, they conclude that ―Hispanic population growth is self-sustaining, even if 
immigration were to be seriously curtailed through new restrictive legislation‖ (p. 342).  Growth 
in Hispanic populations is, therefore, not only leading to population growth but also to changes 
in the age structure of the population in non-metropolitan areas—making it younger.  This also 
suggests that studies of the impact of Hispanic immigration on local economies in non-
metropolitan areas should focus not on the impact of the immigrants alone, but on the total 
growth in the Hispanic population (including the U.S.-born children of Hispanic immigrants).  
New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration (Zuniga and 
Hernandez-Leon, 2005) documents these and other changes and points out that many of these 
new destinations may lack the fiscal and social resources to adequately assist the newcomers as 
they are integrated into the community.  In other words, it is not clear whether the growth of the 
Hispanic population in non-metropolitan and previously shrinking areas is, on balance, good or 
bad for small-town America.    
Definitions of what is good or bad for small town America are obviously value-laden and 
contentious.  In this paper, we focus on the simple issue of whether faster growth in the Hispanic 
population is linked to faster growth in income per capita in rural areas and small towns.  While 
there is a large literature on the impact of immigration on wages, taxes, government spending 
and housing prices in metropolitan areas in the United States (for a review of the literature, see 2 
 
Card, 2007), we know of no published research that examines the impact of   immigrationon the 
health of local economies in non-metropolitan and previously depressed areas, and this is 
especially true with respect to the influence of the growing Hispanic population on these areas.  
It is important to acknowledge that our analysis is not strictly of the impact of immigration as we 
analyze all population change, from immigration and from natural population growth. Moreover, 
motivated by the USA Today article and the academic research cited above, we divide 
population change between that arising from Hispanics and non-Hispanics.  The analysis is 
unique due to our focus on one ethnic (immigrant) group, but the growth of this group is the 
principal component in the population growth in a large number of non-metropolitan and 
previously depressed areas. 
Our results indicate strong support for the hypothesis that Hispanic population growth has 
fueled increased growth in per capita income in those small, rural communities whose 
populations had been in decline during the 1970s and 1980s.    More specifically, we find that 
Hispanic population growth is positively linked to growth in per capita income in non-
metropolitan counties but not in counties in small or large metropolitan areas.  Further, we find 
that Hispanic population growth is positively linked to faster income per capita growth in 
communities that had lost population in the 1970s and 1980s, but generally associated with 
slower growth in communities whose population was growing during the ‘70 and ‗80s.  Finally, 
we find the influx of Hispanic immigrant families had a positive effect on growth in income per 
capita in both non-metropolitan areas whose populations had declined and non-metropolitan 
areas whose populations had been rising, but the effect is substantially larger for the former than 
for the latter.  For example, using our preferred instrumental variable estimates, a 10% increase 
in the Hispanic population in non-metropolitan area counties leads to a 0.62% increase in the rate 
of growth of per capita income (while an increase in the non-Hispanic population in these same 
counties leads to a statistically significant  reduction in per capita income).  When we divide the 
sample between counties that had previously been losing population and those that had 
previously been gaining population, we find that a 10% increase in the Hispanic population leads 
to a 1.2% increase in the rate of growth of per capita income in non-metropolitan counties where 
population had been declining in the 1970s and 1980s, but only a 0.37% increase in those non-
metropolitan counties where population had been growing in the 1970s and 1980s.     3 
 
The remainder of this paper contains seven sections. In the first section, we discuss the 
literature relating immigration to regional economic growth.  The second section documents the 
growing trend of Hispanic immigration and natural population growth outside of traditional 
immigrant destinations, contrasting it with trends in non-Hispanic population changes. In the 
second section we also state our basic hypotheses with respect to Hispanic population growth.  
We explain the empirical methodology and data in the third and fourth sections.  Our results are 
discussed in the fifth and we discuss robustness in the sixth.  The seventh section summarizes the 
results and suggests avenues of additional research. 
 
1.  Immigration and Economic Growth 
As noted, in our empirical analysis we analyze the impact of changes in the Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic population on economic growth.  Changes in the Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
population of a county may come from immigration or natural sources, although changes in the 
Hispanic population in a county are closely related to changes in the total immigrant population.  
This is not surprising given that Hispanic immigrants were such a large proportion of total 
immigrants to the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.  For example, using data on the 
Hispanic and immigrant population by county for 1990 and 2000 (the data is described later in 
the paper), we find that the correlation coefficient between changes in the proportion of the 
Hispanic population in a county and changes in the immigrant population in a county is over 
0.90.  Unfortunately, the publicly available data do not allow us to distinguish the Hispanic 
immigrant population in a county from their children. Our focus on population change rather 
than immigration means that our analysis and inferences must be careful to provide the 
appropriate caveats and qualifiers that our results are not direct tests of theories related to 
immigration and growth. 
  In this section, we review the economic literature linking immigration to growth in 
income.  In neo-classical models of economic growth, the impact of natural population increase 
on growth in per capita incomes is negative while the impact of immigration on economic 
growth is ambiguous.  The simple Solow model of economic growth in a closed economy 
predicts that growth in the population will reduce per capita income growth.  In the short run 
(holding capital constant) diminishing marginal returns to labor implies that output per worker 
will fall as more workers are added to a fixed amount of other factors of production.    In the long 4 
 
run steady state, a higher population growth rate reduces the rate of growth in the capital labor 
ratio, which in turn reduces the rate of growth in output per capita.   However, as Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995 and 2004) point out, migrants differ from the native-born population, in part 
because they bring with them accumulated human capital (while newly-born natives must 
acquire human capital locally).    Immigration thus has two, counteracting, effects on per capita 
income growth: the higher labor supply will slow growth, while the higher human capital 
brought by migrants will promote growth.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that 
immigration will promote growth in per capita incomes (the positive effect of higher human 
capital will counteract the negative effect of a higher labor supply) if the human capital of 
immigrants is substantially greater than the human capital of natives.  They write, however, that 
―this condition is unlikely to be satisfied because, as already noted, immigrants tend to have less 
human capital than the residents of the receiving economy‖ (p.293).   Although this may be true 
for traditional immigrant destinations in metropolitan areas with booming economies, we suggest 
that this condition is likely to be fulfilled in localities where the population and economic growth 
had been declining.  In those localities, the younger native-born have largely moved out, leaving 
behind an older population with relatively little human capital (or human capital that has 
depreciated with time).  New, young Hispanic immigrants with families may not only bring 
measurable human capital (such as education), but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
intangible and unmeasurable human capital such as motivation to succeed, an ability to innovate, 
and entrepreneurial talent; they may be more willing to work long and hard and at jobs natives 
will not take.
1   In addition, because they have a longer time horizon to recoup their initial 
investment, younger migrants may be more willing to invest in training and physical capital than 
older natives (Becker, 1993).  Young immigrants may also be more receptive to innovations that 
could disrupt the lives of older, established populations.
2   This implies that immigrants into 
                                                           
1 There is an extensive literature arguing that migrants are favorably self-selected (for example, see Borjas, 1987 
and Chiswick, 1999).  Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992) find that this favorable self-selection is greater for internal 
migrants within in the United States (between regions) compared to international immigrants.  Chiswick and Miller 
(2008) show that in the United States this favorable self-selection is more pronounced among less-educated 
workers compared to more-educated workers.  Grey and Woodrick (2005) document this positive self-selection of 
Hispanic immigrants in the context of an American small town, Marshalltown Iowa.   
2 Poot (2008) argues (or hypothesizes) that because younger people are more likely to migrate, outmigration from 
a region generally results in population aging and is empirically associated with a loss of regional competitiveness, 
while youthful immigrants bring entrepreneurship and other general human capital that have growth-enhancing 
effects. Parente and Prescott (1999) argue that younger people are more likely to adopt growth-inducing 
innovations than are older generations, because older generations have specific human capital that is attached to 5 
 
small towns and rural areas that had been declining may indeed have substantially more 
(measurable and unmeasureable) human capital than the labor force already in those localities, 
and therefore immigration into these areas may have a positive impact on per capita incomes.     
U. S. counties are not closed economies; not only is labor and human capital mobile 
between counties but so is physical capital (at least in the long run).  Brezis and Krugman (1996) 
present a simple theoretical model of immigration in an open economy with mobile physical 
capital and the possibility of increasing returns to scale.  In such an open economy, immigration 
will induce firms to invest and innovate, and increasing economies of scale will result in output 
increasing more than proportionately as immigration occurs (increasing income from capital as 
well as labor).  Thus, in the long run, immigration results in both increases in wages and 
increases in per capita income.  If human capital and physical capital are complements, then 
immigration can be expected to induce greater investment and innovation and therefore have a 
more positive impact on economic growth.  In an open economy such as U.S. counties, 
immigration is therefore even more likely to have a positive impact on per capita incomes. 
Complementarity between immigrant and native workers could also promote a positive 
causal relationship between immigration and per capita income.  Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and 
Peri (2007) present evidence that in the U.S. more-educated native workers and less-educated 
immigrants are complements.  If this is the case, the influx of Hispanic families may lead to an 
increase in demand for more-educated native labor (managers, teachers, doctors, insurance 
agents, lawyers, etc.).   Since many of the educated youth have left small towns and rural areas 
and are unlikely to return, the supply for educated labor in these non-metropolitan areas is likely 
to be very inelastic.  A less elastic supply of educated labor implies that similar increases in 
demand for educated workers in non-metropolitan areas is likely to lead to greater wage 
increases than in metropolitan areas where the supply of educated labor is likely to be more 
elastic.  Immigrants may thus have a double benefit to the local economy, directly by supplying 
factors of production that are in short supply and indirectly by making educated native labor 
more productive. 
Although there is a large empirical literature on the impact of immigration on wages, 
there is much less empirical literature on the impact of immigration on per capita income.  As 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
older, established technologies.  Parente and Prescott (1999) and Parente and Zhao (2006) also point out that this 
type of “human capital” of younger people is not measureable using traditional measures of human capital.    6 
 
Hanson (2008, p.26) writes, ―So far, empirical literature has little to say about the impact of 
immigration on non-labor income.‖   Since immigration can be expected to change income from 
capital and entrepreneurial effort as well as labor, knowledge of the impact of immigration on 
wages is not sufficient to determine the impact of migration on per capita income.   Among the 
studies which directly estimate the impact of immigration on per capita income, Dolado, Goria 
and Ichino (1994) use a national-level panel data set of OECD countries to estimate Solow 
models of growth that include and exclude migration variables.   Most similar to the current 
study are those papers which examine the impact of internal migration on economic growth in 
different regions of a given country, where growth is in per captia income or per capita output.  
Using data on U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, and regions in Germany, the U.K., Italy, France 
and Spain, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995; 2004) report estimates of empirical growth models 
that both include and exclude a net migration variable.   Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995; 2004) 
find that, after instrumenting for population growth with weather and population density 
variables, the net immigration variable has an insignificant impact on economic growth.   
Following the approach used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995; 2004), other empirical 
research examining the impact of migration on regional economic growth comes to mixed 
conclusions.
3  Positive, negative and no effects are found, sometimes even for the same country.  
For example, Perssons (1997) and Shioji (2001) find that net migration has a positive impact on 
regional economic growth in Sweden and Japan, respectively; Peeters (2008) finds that net 
migration has a negative impact on regional economic growth in Belgium; and Soto and Torche 
(2004) find that net migration has an insignificant impact on regional economic growth in Chile.  
Studying Turkey, Kirdar and Saracaglu (2007) find that net migration has a negative impact on 
regional economic growth while Gezici and Hewings (2004) find there is no significant impact 
of net migration on growth.    Etzo (2008b) and Osterbye and Westerlund (2007) show that the 
impact of migrants on regional economic growth depends on the characteristics of migrants, and 
that outmigration may have different effects from in-migration.   Etzo(2008b) finds that, on 
average, a net gain of migrants has a small positive impact on regional growth in Italy, but that 
the positive impact of net immigration occurs only if migrants are more highly skilled than 
natives.  Etzo (2008b) further finds that the impacts of outmigration and immigration on 
economic growth are not symmetrical; while emigration has a negative impact, and immigration 
                                                           
3  This literature is summarized in Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot (2009) and Etzo (2008a). 7 
 
has a positive impact, on economic growth, the quantitative impact of emigration on regional 
growth is larger.  He infers from these results that the positive impact of net migration on 
economic growth in Italian regions is driven by selective emigration rather than immigration.  
Etzo (2008b) concludes that these results reflect patterns of migration where regions with high 
emigration rates tend to lose high skilled workers while regions with high immigration rates tend 
to gain low skilled workers.  Osterbye and Westerlund (2007) find that net migration has a 
positive impact on regional growth in Norwegian counties but a negative impact in Swedish 
counties.   
An additional issue that arises in models which allow for migration is the extent to which 
migration affects the speed of convergence to long run equilibrium.  An early and important 
question in the growth literature concerned how quickly, if ever, low income countries or regions 
would catch up to high income areas.  While it is not our focus, our analysis estimates the 
convergence coefficient for counties of the United States, so we mention the results in the 
literature here to provide a basis of comparison to our findings.  Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1994)  
report that adding the migration variable to their national level panel data models of growth 
reduces the convergence coefficient.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995; 2004)  also find weak 
evidence that adding immigration to a Solow migration model raises the convergence coefficient.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p.486) write: ―The evidence here is not definitive but suggests 
that migration plays only a minor role in the convergence story.‖  Osterbye and Westerlund 
(2007) suggest a more nuanced interpretation inferring from their results that ―migration between 
counties with different human capital endowments is more important for convergence than the 
mobility between similar counties‖ (p. 912). 
   The empirical literature on the impact of net population growth and immigration on 
growth in per capita income thus provides mixed results, even when authors examine the same or 
similar countries.  This is not surprising, given that the theory described above indicates 
countervailing influences of immigration on growth.
4  If the relative human capital of migrants 
and natives differs between regions, as we argue it might differ between regions where 
population had been declining and areas where population and the economies had been growing, 
                                                           
4 Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot (2009) note that different results may also be due to the econometric technique used 
to estimate the impact of immigration on regional economic growth, with studies that use panel data and 
instrumental variable estimates yielding smaller coefficient estimates on the migration variable in the growth 
regression. 8 
 
then it is also important to estimate the impact of immigration on economic growth separately for 
these areas.   We know of no studies in the literature that estimate the impact of immigration on 
economic growth in small towns and rural areas, or for local areas that had been losing 
population compared to local areas that had been gaining population.   As immigration to rural 
areas is largely from Hispanics, as indicated in the popular press and academic research cited 
above, our focus is on the impact of this group.  We turn now to documenting this contribution of 
the Hispanic immigrants and their families to rural and small town population change during the 
1990s and 2000s.  
 
2. Population Trends and Hypotheses 
We use data from the County and State Data Book on the Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
populations for each county in the U.S. to construct Figures 1 and 2.  In Figure 1 the U. S. 
counties that experienced population declines in the 1970s or 1980s are colored white.  Figure 1 
shows that in the 1970s and 1980s population shrank in non-metropolitan areas across wide 
swaths of the Great Plains in the Midwest, Appalachia in the East, and parts of the Old South.
 5  
Figure 2 identifies the U.S. counties that experienced increases in Hispanic populations in the 
1990s and 2000s even as non-Hispanic populations continued to decline (these counties are 
shaded light green), compared to counties that continued to lose both Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
populations (white) or gain both Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations (dark green).   As is 
clear from a comparison of Figures 1 and 2, counties which would have continued population 
declines were it not for an increase in the Hispanic population are often the same as those 
counties in the Midwest, Appalachia and the Old South where populations shrank in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Table 1 reports the percentage change in total population, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic 
population within counties classified by metropolitan status and the change in population during 
the 1970s and 1980s.
6  The evidence from the table reveals that, on average, in the 1990s and 
                                                           
5 Counties that are losing population are also likely to be counties that have depressed economies.  For the 1970-
2005 period, the correlation coefficient across counties between population growth rates and growth rates in real 
income is 0.83.  Between 1970 and 1990, over 20% of the counties that lost population experienced a decline in 
total real income, while less than 2% of the counties with growing populations experienced negative economic 
growth). 
6 Our data provide evidence to confirm the results in the literature that those who moved out tended to be 
younger, so that the typical resident became older in those counties that lost population.  By 1990, in those 9 
 
2000s population growth resumed in counties that had been shrinking in the 1970s and 1980s, 
despite a continuing decline in the non-Hispanic population in these counties.  Population growth 
resumed in counties of all sizes whose populations had been shrinking in the 1970s and 1980s 
because the growth of the Hispanic population in those counties outweighed the loss of non-
Hispanics.
7   
Grey and Woodrick (2005) provide context for these trends from a specific destination 
city, Marshalltown, Iowa.  They document the rapid growth in the Hispanic population, 
predominantly Mexicans from the same town in Mexico, and indicate the impacts on the 
community. One impact is ―the 2000 census would have shown further population decline if it 
were not for the in-migration of Mexicans‖ (Grey and Woodrick, 2005, p. 136).  Marshalltown 
had been losing population, in part because natives were unwilling to take jobs in the town‘s 
largest employer, a meatpacking plant, and the existing population was getting older.  Prior to the 
rapid growth in the immigrant population, employers in Marshalltown were unable to find 
qualified employees as the number of applicants per opening was less than one.  In agriculture 
generally, there was about one applicant for every two job openings, and at the meatpacking 
plant there were two applicants for every three openings. 
The aggregate data and the Marshalltown experience suggest a clear role for Hispanic 
immigrants in reversing the population declines and, possibly, the income decreases experienced 
by rural America.  We hypothesize that the impact of Hispanic immigration and natural 
population growth on the economies of non-metropolitan counties is different from the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
counties that lost population in the 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of the population 65 years old or older was 
17%, compared to only 13% in counties where population had been growing.  Over all years, the correlation 
between the proportion of a county’s population that is Hispanic and the proportion 65 and older is negative (-
0.10). 
7  Our data also provide evidence that the influx of Hispanics into a county makes the population and workers 
younger.  The correlation between the proportion of a county that is Hispanic and the proportion of the population 
that is young working age (18-44) is positive, while the correlation between the proportion of the county that is 
Hispanic and the proportion of a county’s population that is 65 years or older is negative.  To estimate of the causal 
impact of Hispanic immigration into a county on the age structure of the population of working age, we also 
estimated first difference regression where the dependent variable is log of the proportion of young working age 
population (18-44) and the independent variables include the log of the Hispanic population, the log of the non-
Hispanic population, and year dummy variables.  Following the procedure described in section 2, to correct for 
potential endogeneity we also instrument the population variables with the number of heating days, cooling days, 
and the lagged Hispanic population.  The results of these estimations indicated that an increase in the Hispanic 
population of a county causes a statistically significant increase in the proportion of the population between 18 
and 44 years old, while an increase in the non-Hispanic population causes a statistically significant fall in the 
proportion of the population between 18 and 44. 10 
 
increased Hispanic population growth on metropolitan areas, and that the impact of Hispanic 
population growth on the economies in depressed areas may be different from the impact of 
increased Hispanic population growth in areas that already have booming economies.   
Non-metropolitan counties, especially those that experienced declining population in the 
1970s and 1980s, may suffer from insufficient supply of capital, labor, and entrepreneurial spirit.  
The young Hispanic immigrant families may provide each of these to their new community as 
well as a willingness to tackle difficult, dangerous, or unpleasant jobs.  In other words, the 
immigrant families supply resources in short supply which, therefore, may have a larger positive 
effect on a local economy than those same resources would have where they are plentiful. 
Consequently, in our analysis we will estimate the impact of Hispanic population growth on the 
local economies of counties that had been declining, separately from the impact on the local 
economies of counties that were already growing.  We will also estimate the impact of Hispanic 
population growth separately for declining and growing counties in large metropolitan areas, 
smaller metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas. 
 
3.  Methodology 
To test the hypothesis that Hispanic population growth and non-Hispanic population 
growth might have different impacts on economic growth in a county, we will estimate economic 
growth equations using county-level panel data.  Following the practice in the empirical growth  




Where yit is the log of real income per capita in county i during year t,  is a vector of human 
capital characteristics of the county‘s population, including variables reflecting educational 
attainment and age distribution. The Ci are county fixed effects and Tt are time fixed effects.  
Among other things, the county-specific fixed effects reflect the initial level of technology, 
geographic location, culture, and county-specific measurement errors.   Time fixed effects reflect 
changes over time that are assumed to be common to all counties, such as the rate of change in 11 
 
productivity and the depreciation rate.  σ, γ1 γ2 and the vector β are parameters to be estimated, 
and ʵ captures unobserved and or unobservable influences on the economic growth.   
The lagged value of the income per capita reflects the levels of technology and factors of 
production (such as capital) at the beginning of each period.  This empirical growth equation is 
an operationalization of the basic Solow neoclassical growth model, augmented with human 
capital (details of the derivation of the empirical growth equation from the Solow growth model 
can be found in Hoeffler, 2002; Bond, Hoeffler and Temple, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 
Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; and Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992).  In the Solow model, counties 
that begin with higher output per worker will grow more slowly so that, over time, the Solow 
model predicts convergence towards a steady state output per capita growth rate across counties.  
This implies that we expect the coefficient σ to be negative (formally, ˃ = ˃
*+ 1 = -e
-ψt, where  ψ 
denotes the rate of convergence to the steady state).  The model predicts that investment in 
human capital will have positive effects on economic growth.
  On the other hand, holding other 
factors of production constant, the Solow model predicts that growth in the labor force will have 
a negative effect on growth in output per worker.  Thus, the Solow model predicts that the 
estimated coefficients on the population variables in the growth equation will be negative.   
We extend the basic empirical economic growth model by allowing the impact of 
population growth on economic growth to differ depending on whether the population growth is 
in the Hispanic population (hispit) or the non-Hispanic population (nonhispit). We follow Hall 
and Jones (1999) and use the levels of the population as independent variables. Earlier we 
explained why we hypothesize that Hispanic population growth may have a positive impact on 
income per capita in non-metropolitan counties that have been experiencing declining population 
and economic recession. The coefficients   can be interpreted as change in the rate of 
growth in real income per capita brought about by a one percent increase in the Hispanic or non-
Hispanic (respectively) population.  Using  , we test the hypothesis that the impact of 
Hispanic population growth on economic growth differs from the impact of population growth in 
general.   In addition, we test the hypothesis that the impact of Hispanic immigrants on the local 
economy differs for counties experiencing growing populations and those experiencing declining 
populations and the hypothesis that Hispanic immigrants have a different impact in large 
metropolitan counties, small metropolitan counties, and non-metropolitan counties.   12 
 
Our interest is in the causal impact of population growth on the local economy, but there 
is likely to be an endogenous relationship between the vitality of a local economy and population 
growth that may make causality difficult to determine.  That is, a positive correlation between 
population growth and local per capita income could be due to a growing local economy 
attracting a larger population rather than a higher population causing a growing local economy.  
On the other hand, the evidence presented in the last section suggests that in the 1990s and 2000s 
Hispanic immigrant families were attracted to counties with declining populations and 
economies.  In this case, the bias in the estimate of the impact of population growth on economic 
growth could be in the opposite direction.  Failure to account for this reverse causation would 
produce biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates.   We will address this possible reverse 
causation (endogeneity) issue using instrumental variables methods.   We will first estimate a 
two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) model where we instrument the 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic population growth using historic Hispanic immigration trends and 
the number of heating days and cooling days (which reflect whether recent temperatures have 
been comfortable).  These are instrumental variables used commonly in the literature on the 
impact of population growth and migration (see, for example, Card, 2007, Saiz, 2003 and 2007; 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).   
The 2SLS-IV technique may result in biased estimates of the coefficients because the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the estimated growth 
equation creates a potential bias, as the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the 
error term in the regression.  Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a dynamic panel data model that 
addresses the problems of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error 
terms (and also the potential problem of first-order autocorrelated errors).  In addition, the 
Arellano and Bond technique provides additional instrumental variables that can be useful in 
addressing the endogeneity of other independent variables (such as Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
population growth).  The Arellano and Bond ―difference GMM‖ model estimates the  regression 
using first differences, and uses the values of the levels of the exogenous variables lagged two or 
more periods as additional instruments for the potentially endogenous independent variables (in 
addition to the temperature variables used in the 2SLS-IV).  We follow Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and use the simplest two period lag structure in constructing the instrumental variables 
(limiting the number of lags is also important because of the limited time series in the data).   13 
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the difference GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bond performs poorly when the time series are highly persistent over time.  In this 
case, lagged levels of the variables are weak instruments for subsequent first differences.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a ―system GMM‖ estimator that combines the first difference 
equations described in the last paragraph with an additional set of equations in levels that use 
lagged first differences as instruments.   
In this paper, we present estimates using the 2SLS-IV estimator, the difference GMM 
estimator, and the system GMM estimator (as well as the simple OLS fixed-effects estimator for 
comparison purposes).  As we shall see, our results are not sensitive to the econometric 
technique used to estimate the growth equation. 
 
4.  Data 
  We construct a panel data set of all U.S. counties for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
and 2005.  From the County and State Data Book, we collected, for each county in the U.S. for 
each year, data on per capita income and the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations.  Nominal 
per capita income is deflated using the most detailed regional Consumer Price Index available.  
Variables reflecting the educational attainment and age structure of the population of each 
county also come from the County and State Data Book and are available for 1980, 1990 and 
2000 (these variables are the proportion of the population: with a high school education, with a 
college education, between 0 and 5 years old, between 18 and 65 years old, and older than 65).  
From the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) we collected the number of 
heating degree days and cooling degree days for each county for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005.  
Heating degree days is a measure of how often the temperature falls low enough that buildings 
need to be heated, cooling degree days measure how often the temperature is high enough that 
buildings need to be air conditioned; as such they are measures of whether recent temperatures 
have been too hot or too cold to be comfortable outside. 
  We first estimate growth equations for all counties, and then estimate growth equations 
separately for counties that are part of a Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA--larger 
cities), for counties that are part of other Metropolitan Statistical Areas (other MSAs--smaller 
metropolitan areas), and for counties that are not in an MSA (small towns and rural areas).  
Appendix table A presents summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the growth 14 
 
regressions for all counties and for non-MSAs.  The full panel is of 3101 counties, with 
observations at five points in time over a 35 year period (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005).  The 
first four columns of table A present the average growth in per capita income across counties for 
1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005.  On average, income growth rates are highest 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  The next set of columns in table A present summary statistics for the 
variables used to estimate the growth regressions.  Because the regressions include values of the 
dependent and independent variables lagged one period, and because some of the variables 
needed to estimate the regression are not available in 2005, the explanatory variables used to 
estimate the economic growth equation are from 1980, 1990 and 2000.
8    
 
5.  Results 
  The results of the economic growth regressions estimated using data from all counties are 
presented in table 2.   The estimated equations perform well.  In all specifications, the 
coefficients are almost always statistically significant and the signs of the coefficients are as 
expected.  The coefficients on the education variables are positive and significant, and counties 
with a higher working age population (18-64 years old) have faster economic growth.  In all 
specifications, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is negative, significant and within 
the range reported in the literature.  We have more to say about this coefficient below.   
The instrumental variables in the 2SLS-IV regressions are required to fulfill two 
conditions: they must be correlated with the variables that they instrument for, and they must be 
uncorrelated with the error term in the economic growth regression.  We test whether our data 
fulfill the first assumption by jointly testing the statistical significance of the instrumental 
variables in the first-stage regressions.  In both first stage regressions (where the dependent 
variables are the log of the Hispanic population and the log of the non-Hispanic population, 
respectively) the instrumental variables, as a group, are always highly statistically significant.  
The cold degree days and heating degree days instrumental variables are significant for both 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations in almost all first-stage regressions, no matter the sample 
                                                           
8 The total number of observations for each variable used in the regression is 9303 (3101 counties for three years).  
The number of observations used in each regression is less than 9303 because we do not have data on heating degree 
and cooling degree days (instrumental variables) for all counties and years and because we use the log of the 
Hispanic population as an explanatory variable in the regressions, and therefore lose the 78 county/year 
combinations where the Hispanic population is reported as zero. 
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used.  In the regressions reported in table 2, in the first stage regressions the lagged Hispanic 
population variable is significant and negative for both the Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
populations.  In the first stage regressions for other sub-samples of the counties, the lagged 
Hispanic population variable is almost always a significant and negative determinant of Hispanic 
population growth, but is most often an insignificant determinant of non-Hispanic population 
growth.  The negative relationship between lagged Hispanic population and current growth in the 
Hispanic population is consistent with the phenomenon that Hispanics have recently been 
moving disproportionately to non-traditional destinations (where historically the Hispanic 
population is small).   The Sargan/Hansen test statistics, reported at the bottom of table 2, test the 
null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are correlated with the error term in the economic 
growth regression.  The p-values of the Sargan/Hansen test statistics for the 2SLS-IV estimates 
indicate that we can reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are correlated with the 
error term in the structural equation.  Also reported at the bottom of table 2 are Hausman test 
statistics for the null hypothesis that the 2SLS-IV estimates are not significantly different from 
the simple OLS estimates with county fixed effects.    We can clearly reject this hypothesis, 
indicating that endogeneity bias is present in the simple OLS estimates and, therefore, that the 
2SLS-IV estimates are preferred.   
The difference and system GMM estimates assume that the errors in the non-differenced 
equations are serially correlated of degree 1.  Table 2 presents the test statistic developed in 
Arellano and Bond (1991) to test the null hypotheses that the errors do not exhibit serial 
correlation.  We can reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the difference and system GMM 
estimates are appropriate.  However, the Sargan/Hansen statistics indicate that the expanded 
instrumental variable set used in the difference and system GMM estimates is correlated with the 
error term in the structural equation.  This leads us to view the GMM results with some 
skepticism.  Given doubts about the validity of the instruments used in the difference and system 
GMM estimates, our preferred estimates are the 2SLS-IV estimates, although our qualitative 
conclusions are not sensitive to the technique used to estimate the growth regressions. 
  The non-Hispanic population variable has a negative but insignificant coefficient in the 
OLS fixed effects regression.  As discussed previously, the estimate of this coefficient may be 
biased due to reverse causation, or endogeneity, between economic growth and population 
growth (higher economic growth could attract a higher population).   The 2SLS-IV and GMM 16 
 
estimators are an attempt to correct for this endogeneity bias, and in the 2SLS-IV estimates the 
coefficient on the non-Hispanic population variable becomes more negative and statistically 
significant.  This negative and significant coefficient is consistent with the effect of population 
growth on economic growth predicted by the Solow model.  The coefficient on the non-Hispanic 
population variable is also negative and significant in the difference GMM estimate, but not in 
the system GMM estimate.   
On the other hand, the coefficient on the Hispanic population variable is positive and 
significant in all specifications.  Further, the size of the coefficient increases when we compare 
the 2SLS-IV and GMM estimates to the OLS fixed-effects estimate.  This implies that Hispanics 
are being attracted to slow growing counties, and that once we control for this type endogeniety 
the positive impact of Hispanic immigration on county per capita income growth is larger.  In 
our preferred 2SLS-IV estimates, a 1% increase in the Hispanic population of a county leads to 
about a 0.07% increase in the growth rate of real per capita income.   
The coefficient on the lagged value of log income per capita is an estimate of ˃ (= -e
-ψt ) 
and an indication of the speed of convergence to the steady state level of income per capita.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2003) show that in the Solow neoclassical model of economic 
growth, including the potential for migration in the theoretical model raises the convergence 
coefficient (ψ).  For our analysis, this larger convergence coefficient would mean an estimated 
value of ˃ smaller in absolute value.  Moreover, ―if migration is an important source of 
convergence‖, when migration is appropriately accounted for in the regression analysis, ―then the 
estimated convergence coefficient (ψ) should become smaller‖  (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,1995, 
p. 410).  This implies that we should observe the absolute value of the coefficient on the lagged 
value of per capita income in the growth regressions to be larger in regressions that omit the 
population variables, compared to regressions that include the population variables and correct 
for endogeneity (the latter results are presented in table 2).  When we re-estimate the equations 
reported in table 2, but omit the population variables, the absolute value of the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is always larger than the absolute value of the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable in the specifications reported in table 2. In other words, our data and 
models conform to the Barro and Sala-i-Martin theoretical analysis. 
9 
                                                           
9 This is also true when we consider only the sub-sample of non-metropolitan counties (whether growing or 
declining in population).  When we re-estimate the economic growth regressions for these sub-samples of 17 
 
Our results are also similar to their empirical findings which provide weak evidence that 
adding immigration to a Solow migration model raises the convergence coefficient.  Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004, p.486) write: ―The evidence here is not definitive but suggests that 
migration plays only a minor role in the convergence story.‖  In equations that omit the 
population variable but are otherwise identical to those in the columns of table 2, the coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable is (standard errors in parentheses): -0.137 (0.012) for the fixed 
effects model (compared to -0.110, from column 2 in table 2); -0.349 (0.010) for the first 
difference model (compared to -0.326, from column 3 in table 2); -0.841 (0.097) for the 
Difference GMM (compared to -0.698 in table 2); and -0.756 (0.032) for the System GMM 
(compared to -0.722 in table 2).   
The results presented in table 2 suggest that while general population growth has a 
negative impact on income per capita in an average county, Hispanic population growth has a 
positive impact.
10  However, table 3 shows that Hispanic population growth has a positive impact 
on per capita income only in those counties that had been losing population in the 1970s and 
1980s and only in small towns and rural counties (counties not in an MSA).  When the economic 
growth regression is re-run using data only from counties that had been losing population, the 
estimated impact of Hispanic population growth on per capita income growth is positive and 
statistically significant in all specifications.  On the other hand, in the estimates of the economic 
growth equations that use data only from counties whose populations were growing in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the results from most specifications indicate that Hispanic population growth has 
negative impacts on per capita income.  Table 3 also presents the estimates of the growth 
regressions separately for counties in large metropolitan areas (PSMAs), smaller MSAs, and 
non-MSAs (small towns and rural areas).  Only in the small towns and rural areas (non-MSAs) is 
the estimated impact of Hispanic population growth consistently positive and significant.  In 
large and small metropolitan areas Hispanic population growth has a negative or insignificant 
estimated impact on economic growth in all but one specification. 
Table 4 reinforces the point that Hispanic population growth has a positive impact on per 
capita income growth only in small towns and rural areas that had been losing population in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
counties, but omit the population variables, then the absolute value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is consistently larger than the absolute value on the lagged dependent variable when the population 
variables are included.  These results are available upon request.   
10 Because we do not weight the data by a county’s population, the regression results do not represent the impact 
of population growth on the average person in the United States, but rather on an average county.   18 
 
1970s and 1980s; for this group of counties the coefficient on the Hispanic population variable is 
always positive and significant, no matter the econometric technique used to estimate the 
economic growth equation.  Using our preferred 2SLS-IV estimates, a 1% increase in the 
Hispanic population in these counties leads to a 0.12% to 0.17% increase in the growth rate of 
per capita real income. Hispanic population growth also has a (smaller) positive impact in small 
towns and rural areas where the population grew in the 1970s and 1980s.  On the other hand, in 
the estimates using data from large cities and smaller MSAs, the estimated impact of Hispanic 
population growth on per capita income is either negative or statistically insignificant (except for 
the system GMM estimate, which failed some specification tests and which we therefore view 
with some skepticism). 
The results of the estimated per capita income growth regressions clearly indicate that 
Hispanic immigrant and population growth has had a positive impact on real income per capita 
in America‘s small towns and rural areas in the last 25 years.  On the other hand, there is no clear 
evidence that the influx of Hispanic immigrants has had a similar positive impact on the 
economies of counties in small or large metropolitan areas.   
 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section we describe several checks of the robustness of our main findings. We do 
not include tables of these results because they are very similar to those reported already, but 
they are available upon request.   
One possibility is that what we have found is evidence that the influx of Hispanics has 
induced an increase in government transfer payments into the county.  In order to test this 
possibility, we re-estimated the economic growth regressions after subtracting transfers from the 
measure of income (so that income measured only non-transfer income).  The results of this 
specification test indicate that transfer payments are not driving our results.  In these alternative 
growth regressions a larger Hispanic population in a county causes increases in the per capita 
income growth rate, but only in counties not in MSAs.  As above, the positive impact of 
Hispanic population growth is larger in those counties that had been losing population in the 
1970s and 1980s.  The magnitudes of the estimated effects are similar to those reported above 
and in the tables.  19 
 
In the main analysis, we used first difference regression and the log of the Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic population to capture the impact of changes in these populations on economic 
growth.   As a specification test, we also re-estimated the economic growth regressions using the 
rates of growth of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations as independent variables, as is 
done in much of the economic growth literature (for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1994 and 
2005).  As another specification test, we also re-estimated the economic growth regressions 
using the log of total population and the proportion of the population that is Hispanic as two 
independent variables, as is common in the migration literature (especially the literature on the 
impact of immigration on wages as in, for example, Card, 2007).  The results of the regressions 
using both of these alternative measures of the Hispanic population in a county are consistent 
with the results presented in this paper.  That is, a higher growth rate in the Hispanic population 
(or a higher proportion of the population that is Hispanic) in a county causes increases in the per 
capita income growth rate, but only in counties not in MSAs.  As above, both alternative 
specifications indicate that the positive impact of Hispanic population growth is larger in those 
counties that had been losing population in the 1970s and 1980s.  The magnitudes of the 
estimated effects are similar to those reported earlier.   
As our final specification test, we re-estimated the instrumental variable equations 
excluding the lagged Hispanic population in the first stage regressions (leaving only heating and 
cooling days as instruments).  When we did this, the signs and significance levels of the 
coefficients on the population variables in the structural equations were the same as those 
reported in the table. 
In summary, our results do not appear to be sensitive to the econometric technique used 
to estimate the growth regressions, to the functional form of the population variables, to the 
specific measurement of the per capita income variable, nor to the specific set of instrumental 
variables used. 
 
  7. Summary  
In the 1990s, rural and small towns in the United States, which had been losing 
population, became the destinations for an increasing number of Hispanic immigrants and their 
families. In this paper, we have focused on the question of whether Hispanic immigration into 
American small towns and rural areas has benefited those communities whose populations had 20 
 
been declining in the 1970s and 1980s by reviving their economic growth.  The answer to this 
question is yes; a growing Hispanic population has a causal positive effect on real per capita 
income in counties not in metropolitan statistical areas.  These same positive effects of a growing 
Hispanic population are not found for counties in metropolitan statistical areas (either large or 
small SMSAs).  Further, the positive impact of Hispanic immigration on small towns and rural 
areas is larger for those non-metropolitan areas that had been losing their non-Hispanic 
population, compared to those that had been gaining population.   These results are very robust 
across several specifications and the econometric technique used to estimate the economic 
growth regressions. 
The reason for the causal connection between Hispanic influx and faster growth may be 
one or more of several possibilities. Perhaps Hispanic immigrants and their children can 
revitalize small towns because they make the population younger; possibly the immigrants have 
human capital, entrepreneurial talent or a willingness to work long and hard, and at jobs natives 
will not take, that can provide a shot in the arm to the local economy.  While our analysis cannot 
identify the precise mechanism by which Hispanic immigration contributes to small town 
growth, we do establish the existence of this relationship in the data.  As such, we can reject the 
suggestion that the Hispanic immigrants are a drain on already struggling small town and rural 
economies.   
Economic growth is only one potential impact of a growing Hispanic population on small 
towns and rural areas.  Extensions to this paper should seek to understand how the immigrants 
have affected the public fiscal situation, the structure of local economies, or the cost of living.  
Future research on these issues in combination with the findings of this paper are necessary if we 
are to answer completely the question posed in the title, ―Are Hispanic Immigrant Families 
Reviving the Economies of America‘s Small Towns?‖.  
   21 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Arellano, Manuel, and Stephen R. Bond. 1991. ―Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: 
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.‖ Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 58(2): 277-297. 
 
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004.  Economic Growth: Second Edition. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1995. Economic Growth. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Becker, Gary. 1993. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education: Third Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Blundell, Richard W., and Stephen R. Bond. 1998. ―GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel 
Data: An Application to Production Functions.‖ Econometric Reviews, 19(3): 321-340. 
 
Bond, Stephen., Anke Hoeffler, and Jonathan Temple. 2001. ―GMM Estimation of Empirical  
Growth Models.‖ Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 3048. 
 
Borjas, George. 1987. ―Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants.‖ American Economic 
Review, 77(4): 531-53. 
 
Borjas, George. ―The Economics of Immigration.‖ Journal of Economic Literature 
32 (1994): 1667–717. 
 
Borjas, George, Stephen Bronars, and Stephen Trejo. 1992. ―Self-selection and Internal 
Migration in the United States.‖ Journal of Urban Economics, 32(2): 159-185. 
 
Brezis, Elise, and Paul Krugman. 1996. ―Immigration, Investment and Real Wages.‖ Journal of 
Population Economics, 9(1): 83-93. 
 
Card, David. 2007. ―How Immigration Affects U.S. Cities.‖ Centre for Research and Analysis of 
Migration Discussion Paper 11-07. 
 
Card, David, and Ethan Lewis. 2007. ―The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s: 
Explanations and Impacts.‖ In Mexican Immigration, ed. George Borjas, 193-228. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Caselli, Francesco, Gerardo Esquivel, and Fernando Lefort. 1996. ―Reopening the Convergence 
Debate: A New Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics.‖ Journal of Economic Growth, 1(3): 
363-389. 
 
Chiswick, Barry. 1999. ―Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?‖  American Economic 
Review, 89(2): 181-185. 
 22 
 
Chiswick, Barry, and Paul Miller. 2008. ―Why is the Payoff to Schooling Smaller for 
Immigrants?‖ Labour Economics, 15(6): 1317-1340. 
 
Dolado, Juan, Alessandra Goria, and Andrea Ichino. 1994. ―Immigration, Human Capital and 
Growth in the Host Country: Evidence from Pooled Country Data.‖ Journal of Population 
Economics, 7(1): 193-215.  
 
El Nasser, Haya. 2008. ―Counties Feel the Impact of Hispanic Immigration; Newer Arrivals 
Counter Communities‘ Shrinking Younger Populations.‖ USA Today. June 30, 1. 
 
Etzo, Ivan. 2008a. ―Internal Immigration: a Review of the Literature.‖ Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive Paper No. 8783. 
 
Etzo, Ivan. 2008b. ―Internal Migration and Growth in Italy.‖ Munich Personal RePEc Archive 
Paper No. 8642. 
 
Friedberg, Rachel M., and Jennifer Hunt. 1995. ―The Impact of Immigration on Host Country 
Wages, Employment, and Growth.‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2): 23-44. 
 
Gezici, Ferhan, and Geoffrey J.D. Hewings. 2004. ―Regional Convergence and the Economic 
Performance of Peripheral Areas in Turkey.‖ Review of Urban and Regional Development 
Studies, 16(2): 113-132 
 
Grey, Mark, and Anne Woodrick. 2005. ‖Latinos Have Revitalized Our Community: Mexican 
Migration and Anglo Responses in Marshalltown, Iowa.‖ In New Destinations: Mexican 
Immigration in the United States, ed. Victor Zuniga and Ruben Hernandez-Leon, 133-154. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Hall, Robert E. and Jones, Charles I. 1999. ―Why Some Countries Produce So Much More 
Output Per Worker Than Others?‖ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1): 83-116. 
 
Hanson, Gordon. 2002. ―The Economic Consequences of the International Migration of Labor.‖ 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14490. 
 
Hoeffler, Anke. 2002. ―The Augmented Solow Model and the African Growth Debate.‖ Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 64(2): 135-158. 
 
Jensen, Leif. 1989. The New Immigration: Implications for Poverty and Public Assistance 
Utilization. New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Johnson, Kenneth, and Daniel Lichter. 2008. ―Natural Increase: A New Source of Growth in 




Kirdar, Murat, and Sirin Saracoglu. 2007. ―Regional Convergence and the Causal Impact off 
Migration on Regional Growth Rates.‖ Middle East Technical University Department of 
Economics, Ankara, Turkey. 
 
Mankiw, Gregory, David Romer, and David Weil. 1992. ―A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth.‖ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2): 407-437.  
 
Osterbye, Stein and Olle Westerlund. 2007. ―Is Migration Important for Regional Convergence? 
Comparative Evidence for Norwegian and Swedish Counties, 1980-2000.‖ Regional Studies, 
41(7): 901-915. 
 
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P., and Giovanni Peri. 2006. ―Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on 
Wages.‖ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12497. 
 
Parente, Stephen, and Edward Prescott. 1994. ―Barriers to Technology Adoption and 
Development.‖ The Journal of Political Economy, 102(2): 298-321. 
 
Parente, Stephen, and Rui Zhao. 2006. ―Slow Development and Special Interests.‖ International 
Economic Review, 47(3): 991-1011. 
 
Peeters, Ludo. 2008. ―Selective In-migration and Income Convergence and Divergence Across 
Belgian Municipalities.‖ Regional Studies, 42(7): 905-921. 
 
Peri, Giovanni. 2007. ―Immigrants‘ Complementarities and Native Wages: Evidence from 
California.‖ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12956. 
 
Perssons, Joakim. 1997. ―Convergence Across the Swedish Counties, 1911-1993.‖ European 
Economic Review, 41(9): 1835-1852. 
 
Poot, Jaques. 2008. ―Demographic Change and Regional Competitiveness: The Effects of 
Immigration and Ageing.‖ International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy, 4(1/2): 
129-145. 
 
Saiz, Albert. 2003. ―Room in the Kitchen for the Melting Pot: Immigration and Rental Prices.‖ 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (3): 502-521. 
 
Saiz, Albert. 2007. "Immigration and Housing Rents in American Cities." Journal of Urban 
Economics, 61(2): 345-371. 
 
Shioji, Etsuro. 2001. ―Composition Effect of Migration and Regional Growth in Japan.‖ Journal 
of the Japanese and International Economies, 15(1): 29-49. 
 
Soto, Aristides, and Raimundo Torche. 2004. ―Spatial Inequality, Migration, and Economic 
Growth in Chile.‖ Cuadernos de Economia, 41(124): 401-424. 
 24 
 
Zuniga, Victor , and Ruben Hernandez-Leon. 2005. New Destinations: Mexican Immigration in 










Figure 1: Counties that increased (in dark green) or decreased (in white) in population in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Figure 2: Counties where the Hispanic population grew and the Non-Hispanic population fell from 1990-2005 (in light green), counties where 




Table 1: Relative Contribution of Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Population to Population Growth 
from 1990 to 2005, calculated separately for counties where population declined or grew in the 
1970s and 1980s 
         







   
     
All Counties 
 
        
with declining population in 
1970s or 1980s ( 1479 
counties) 
 
2.2%  3.6%  -1.5% 
with growing population in 
1970s or 1980s (1622 
counties) 
 
26.6%  10.8%  15.7% 
   
     
Large Metropolitan Areas (PSMSAs)       
with declining population in 
1970s or 1980s (36 counties) 
 
3.0%  5.4%  -2.4% 
with growing population in 
1970s or 1980s (111 counties) 
 
24.5%  15.4%  9.2% 
          Smaller Metropolitan Areas (small SMSAs)       
with declining population in 
1970s or 1980s (113 counties) 
 
2.4%  2.8%  -0.4% 
with growing population in 
1970s or 1980s (439 counties) 
 
29.0%  9.8%  19.2% 
          Non-metropolitan Areas (Non-MSAs)       
with declining population in 
1970s or 1980s (1308 
counties) 
 
0.7%  2.0%  -1.3% 
with growing population in 
1970s or 1980s (1072 
counties) 
 
24.0%  5.8%  18.1% 
           
        Source: Authors' calculations using data from the State and County data book. 
  Notes:  Using the decomposition of population growth rates described in Card (2007, page 5). 
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Table 2: Per Capita Income Growth Regressions, using data from all U.S. counties
Specification
Variable
Dependent Variable:  Log of Real Per Capita Income
Lagged Dependent 
Variable -0.116 (0.012) *** -0.11 (0.015) *** -0.326 (0.013) *** -0.698 (0.099) *** -0.722 (0.035) ***
Log of Hispanic 
Population 0.005 (0.002) ** 0.074 (0.016) *** 0.069 (0.014) *** 0.052 (0.012) *** 0.014 (0.006) **
Log of Non-Hispanic 
Population -0.015 (0.010) -0.438 (0.083) *** -0.596 (0.130) *** -0.698 (0.010) *** 0.109 (0.014) ***
% High School  0.009 (0.000) *** 0.008 (0.000) *** 0.009 (0.001) *** 0.01 (0.008) *** 0.017 (0.001) ***
% College 0.012 (0.001) *** 0.019 (0.002) *** 0.019 (0.002) *** 0.024 (0.002) *** 0.008 (0.001) ***
% Age 0-5 0.027 (0.002) *** 0.037 (0.004) *** 0.028 (0.004) *** 0.027 (0.005) *** 0.007 (0.005)  
% Age 18-64 0.006 (0.001) *** 0.015 (0.002) *** 0.009 (0.002) *** 0.004 (0.002) ** -0.001 (0.002)  
% Age 65 and up 0.006 (0.001) *** 0 (0.002)   -0.001 (0.003)     -0.006 (0.003) ** 0.016 (0.002) ***
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES  
Sargan/Hansen test  
(p-value) - 0.643 1.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman test             
(p-value) - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
test statistic - - -3.982 *** 9.187 *** 4.99 ***
Notes: Significant at 10% (*); significant at 5% (**); significant at 1% (***).  Standard errors are in parenthesis.
All reported standard errors and test statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
OLS with county 
fixed effects
2SLS-IV with county 
fixed effects
2SLS-IV (first 
difference) Difference GMM System GMM28 
 
    
Table 3: Coefficients on the variables that measure the impact of hispanic and non-hispanic 
             population on economic growth in per capita income 
Specification
Sample: Counties with:
Population Loss in the 1970s and 1980s
  Hispanic 0.012 (0.004) *** 0.151 (0.041) *** 0.158 (0.041) *** 0.041 (0.019) *** 0.041 (0.007) ***
  Non-hispanic -0.130 (0.029) *** -0.413 (0.629) 0.499 (0.707) -1.028 (0.198) 0.059 (0.016) ***
Population Gain in the 1970s and 1980s        
  Hispanic -0.003 (0.003) -0.036 (0.016) ** -0.026 (0.014) * 0.044 (0.019) ** -0.038 (0.019) ***
  Non-hispanic 0.017 (0.011) -0.067 (0.068) * 0.050 (0.091)   -0.488 (0.128) *** 0.183 (0.394) ***
PSMA              
  Hispanic -0.012 (0.017) 0.474 (0.489) -2.896 (20.8) 0.288 (0.114) ** -0.028 (0.014) **
  Non-hispanic -0.022 (0.031) -0.626 (0.741) 5.711 (50.7) -0.259 (0.203)   0.025 (0.026)
Small MSA          
  Hispanic -0.012 (0.005) ** -0.081 (0.030) *** -0.091 (0.033) *** -0.016 (0.022) -0.060 (0.011) ***
  Non-hispanic 0.089 (0.015) *** 0.107 (0.063) * 0.197 (0.087) ** 0.176 (0.060) *** 0.104 (0.024) ***
Non-MSA              
  Hispanic 0.009 (0.003) *** 0.058 (0.016) *** 0.062 (0.013) *** 0.061 (0.015) *** 0.030 (0.005) ***
  Non-hispanic -0.041 (0.013) *** -0.536 (0.091) *** -0.690 (0.014) *** 0.887 (0.110) *** 0.017 (0.017)  
Notes: Significant at 10% (*); significant at 5% (**); significant at 1% (***).  Standard errors are in parenthesis.
All reported standard errors and test statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
OLS with county 
fixed effects
2SLS-IV with county 
fixed effects
2SLS-IV (first 




Table 4: Coefficients on the variables that measure the impact of hispanic and non-hispanic 
             population on economic growth in per capita income 
Specification
Sample: Counties with:
PMSA-Population Loss in the 1970s and 1980s
  Hispanic 0.016 (0.036) 0.250 (0.399) -0.025 (0.212) 0.106 (0.102) -0.017 (0.020)
  Non-hispanic 0.352 (0.143) ** 0.388 (0.849) 0.625 (1.004) -0.766 (0.911)   0.000 (0.057)  
PMSA--Population Gain in the 1970s and 1980s        
  Hispanic -0.032 (0.019) * 0.358 (0.434) -1.153 (2.488) 0.464 (0.143) *** -0.029 (0.015) *
  Non-hispanic -0.048 (0.033)   -0.357 (0.630) 2.492 (4.370) -0.411 (0.198) ** 0.042 (0.030)
Small MSA-Population Loss in the 1970s and 1980s
  Hispanic -0.020 (0.010) * 0.387 (0.966) -0.148 (0.160) -0.063 (0.053)   -0.051 (0.028) *
  Non-hispanic 0.303 (0.068) *** -2.991 (8.322) -0.036 (1.436) -0.293 (0.384)   0.167 (0.048) ***
Small MSA--Population Gain in the 1970s and 1980s
  Hispanic -0.011 (0.005) ** -0.084 (0.028) *** -0.087 (0.030) *** 0.002 (0.024) -0.065 (0.011) ***
  Non-hispanic 0.060 (0.019) *** 0.087 (0.077)   0.204 (0.102) ** 0.154 (0.074) ** 0.107 (0.025) ***
Non-MSA-Population Loss in the 1970s and 1980s
  Hispanic 0.014 (0.004) *** 0.171 (0.030) *** 0.123 (0.019) *** 0.118 (0.056) ** 0.054 (0.013) ***
  Non-hispanic -0.148 (0.031) ** 0.600 (0.351) * 0.345 (0.302) -1.964 (0.385) *** -0.004 (0.034)  
Non-MSA-Population Gain in the 1970s and 1980s
  Hispanic 0.002 (0.003) 0.024 (0.019)   0.037 (0.016) ** 0.060 (0.017) *** 0.021 (0.006) ***
  Non-hispanic -0.028 (0.015) * -0.413 (0.116) *** -0.346 (0.164) ** -1.035 (0.170) *** 0.099 (0.018) ***
Notes: Significant at 10% (*); significant at 5% (**); significant at 1% (***).  Standard errors are in parenthesis.
All reported standard errors and test statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
OLS with county 
fixed effects
2SLS-IV with county 
fixed effects
2SLS-IV (first 
difference) Difference GMM System GMM30 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics  
         
           
 
Mean   Std Dev  Min  Max  N 
All Counties 
          Economic Growth (log difference in real per capita incomes) for the following periods: 
1970-1980  0.141  0.143  -1.213  1.031  3101 
1980-1990  0.184  0.147  -0.681  1.413  3101 
1990-2000  0.133  0.106  -0.787  0.773  3101 
2000-2005  0.050  0.095  -2.631  0.604  3101 
            For the sample used in the economic growth regressions (1980, 1990 and 2000) 
Hispanic Population  7448.1  7267.5  0.0  1257529.0  9303 
Non-Hispanic Population  73652.2  210354.3  58.2  5522214.0  9303 
% with high school education  68.8  12.9  25.1  97.0  9303 
% with college education  13.8  6.9  2.8  60.5  9303 
% 0-5 years old  7.1  1.3  0.0  18.0  9303 
% 18 years and older  72.7  4.0  0.0  100.0  9303 
% 65 years and older  14.3  4.3  0.0  34.7  9303 
cold degree days  1315.7  854.2  6.0  4461.0  9228 
heating degree days  4864.9  2131.9  85.0  10343.0  9228 
            Non-MSAs  
          Economic Growth (log difference in real per capita incomes) for the following periods: 
1970-1980  0.164  0.156  -1.213  1.031  2380 
1980-1990  0.185  0.160  -0.681  1.413  2380 
1990-2000  0.125  0.113  -0.787  0.773  2380 
2000-2005  0.059  0.084  -1.354  0.604  2380 
            For the sample used in the economic growth regressions (1980, 1990 and 2000) 
Hispanic Population  1130.6  4155.6  0.0  102837.3  7140 
Non-Hispanic Population  23299.2  21277.5  58.2  220331.0  7140 
% with high school education  67.1  13.1  25.1  96.3  7140 
% with college education  12.3  5.4  3.1  60.5  7140 
% 0-5 years old  7.0  1.4  0.0  18.0  7140 
% 18 years and older  72.6  4.1  0.0  100.0  7140 
% 65 years and older  15.1  4.2  0.0  34.7  7140 
cold degree days  1319.1  840.6  6.0  4461.0  7140 
heating degree days  4958.4  2161.3  173.0  10343.0  7140 
 